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Marvin D. Silver*
N THE RECENT CASE of Brooks v. Temple Sinai, the Court of
Appeals of New York affirmed an award of the Workmen's
Compensation Board in favor of the claimant, holding that "the
evidence sustained a finding of causal relationship between the
splashing of detergent in the claimant's eye and the subsequent
loss of sight in such eye, notwithstanding a prior history of eye
trouble." 1 Two judges protested vigorously on the grounds of
overwhelming testimony against causal relationship and ques-
tioned the granting of the award on the bare legal sufficiency of
other medical opinion.
The dispute between the expert witnesses concerned the
origin and cause of the infection which resulted in the claimant's
loss of use of his right eye. Claimant had a pre-existing bleb2 on
his right eye and the crux of the infection controversy pivoted
on the testimony that the claimant's eye condition, known as
iridocyclitis3 with bacterial origin, could have manifested itself
within one half hour after the detergent had splashed into his
eye. The fatal infection had been diagnosed by the claimant's
physician the day after the injury. The non-causal relationship
testimony averred that the incubation period for an iridocyclitis
with bacterial origin must be at least 48 hours, and that the
infection came from within.
The disturbing element presented by the Brooks case hold-
ing is not so much the ruling concerning the weight of the tes-
timony, but rather the arbitrariness of the court in declaring
the manufacturer liable for an injury caused from the use of its
product by a person having a serious pre-existing injury, who,
with reasonable diligence and care, should have known that any
irritant, such as strong soap or similar detergent, would be del-
eterious upon contact with his existing condition.
* A.B., Ohio University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
1 Brooks v. Temple Sinai, 9 N. Y. 2d 917, 217 N. Y. S. 2d 88 (1961).
2 Stedman's Medical Dictionary, Unabridged Lawyer's Edition (1961), p. 213,
defines "bleb: a collection of fluid beneath the skin; usually the lesions are
smaller than bullas or blisters."
3 Stedman's Medical Dictionary, Unabridged Lawyer's Edition (1961), p. 788,
defines "iridocyclitis: inflammation of both iris and ciliary body."
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The decision of the Brooks court seems to be a stinging con-
tradiction of the generally accepted principles applicable in the
area of products liability. This article will attempt to recon-
struct these principles in order that we may not lose sight of, nor
stray beyond, that which has become the well ordered test of
the manufacturer's liability for injuries sustained from the use
of its products.
The Negligent User and Obvious Danger
Haberly v. Reardon Company involved an action brought
against a paint manufacturer for damages resulting in blinding
of one eye of a minor child, caused by a drop of cement base
paint which splashed into his eye while helping his father paint.4
The court seemed to stress the "natural proclivity of children to
insist upon being in close proximity to a father when he is per-
forming tasks such as painting." 5 In determining the manu-
facturer's liability, the court concluded that had the father been
adequately warned that a blob of that paint lodged in the eye
might mean immediate blindness, his preventative measures
would have been different. Two judges concurred in the pointed
dissent delivered by Judge Hyde, who concluded that "while a
manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused by the use of his
product in the manner and for the purpose for which it is sup-
plied . . . (he) does not warrant that all users will act with-
out negligence in using it." 6 Clearly this principle should have
been applied to the facts in the Brooks case, as being in accord
with the recent holding in Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp.7
wherein the court concluded that a manufacturer is not liable,
under New York law, unless the accident was the result of an
unknown or latent danger not known or obvious to the plaintiff
using the manufactured article.
The "danger" in the Brooks case, to that particular plaintiff
4 Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S. W. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. Mo., 1958).
5 Id. at p. 869.
6 Id. at p. 870.
7 Siemer v. Midwest Mower Corp., 286 F. 2d 381 (8 Cir., 1961). Further
emphasis of this point is made in Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., 155 F. 2d
855 (5 Cir., 1946), wherein the court determined that no one is under an
actionable duty to warn another of a fact of which he is already fully
aware, and that consequently there was no duty owing to the plaintiff by
the defendant to warn the plaintiff because the "danger" of injury from
getting the cleaning agent in the eye was "obvious."
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was clearly obvious, as the facts disclosed the serious nature of
his pre-existing condition and the high susceptibility thereof to
infection.
Negligence and The Normal User
In Lehner v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., the plaintiff sought
damages for alleged injuries (contact dermititis) sustained from
the use of "Tide." She claimed that the defendant was negligent
in marketing a product composed of "harmful, deleterious and
inherently dangerous substances" and did falsely advertise the
product as being "kind and harmless" to hands.8 Reversing a
judgment of the City Court of the City of New York, the Supreme
Court, Appellate Term, deciding as a matter of fact that the plain-
tiff did not establish that the product was harmful or inherently
dangerous, concluded that the results of the tests conducted by
the defendant (a mere redness of hands acquired by a small per-
centage), could not be considered as establishing proof of knowl-
edge by the defendant of a potential danger to a number of per-
sons in using its product.
Negligence and The Allergic User
The decisions concerning known allergic users are clearly
defined in Taylor v. Newcomb Baking Co.9 In that case the
plaintiff was employed as a dishwasher and was supplied with a
strong soap powder which contained a tri-sodium phosphate
base, with instructions by his employer as to how much to use.
He developed a serious allergic dermititis and sued his employer
for negligence. Testimony disclosed that it was common knowl-
edge in the trade that a good percentage of people are "hyper-
sensitive" to soap powder. In granting an award of damages to
the plaintiff, the court emphasized that "It is not necessary that
the majority of employees be susceptible. It is enough if a suf-
ficient number are susceptible so that a jury could reasonably
say that the defendant ought to have known and recognized the
danger of injury and ought to have guarded against it." 10
Authority from the British Empire is clearly expressed in
Board v. Thomas Hedley & Co." In that case, which developed
8 Lehner v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 208 Misc. 186, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 172
(1955).
9 Taylor v. Newcomb Baking Co., 317 Mass. 609, 59 N. E. 2d 293 (1945).
10 Id. at p. 294.
11 Board v. Thomas Hedley & Co., 2 All E. R. 431 (C. A. 1951).
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into an interesting controversy concerning discovery proceedings,
the plaintiff suffered contact dermititis of both hands after using
"Tide," and sued the American manufacturer and the distributor
for negligence, alleging that the product was dangerous and that
the defendant knew or ought to have known this fact. The de-
fendants were ordered to reveal all complaints received prior
and subsequent to the date of the plaintiff's purchase, the latter
being relevant only on the issue of whether or not the product
was in fact dangerous. Holding for the plaintiff, the court de-
clared that "The product would . . . be dangerous if it might
affect normal users adversely, or even if it might adversely affect
other users who had a higher degree of sensitivity than the nor-
mal, so long as they were not altogether exceptional." 12 (Em-
phasis supplied.)
In this area, the courts are prone to consider the manu-
facturer's expert knowledge and access to information concern-
ing his product. However, the confidence of the present-day
detergent manufacturers may be evidenced by the general lack
of warning, on their products, of possible deleterious effects there-
from to the possible class of susceptible or allergic users.
Breach of Warranty and The Normal User
The limitation on recovery on the basis of breach of war-
ranty in cases concerning detergents is particularly well-defined
by the court in Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., wherein
the plaintiff sued the manufacturer for alleged injuries suffered
(contact dermititis) after using "Tide." 13 The court accepted
the circumstances of the purchase as evidence of the plaintiff's
reliance necessary in part to establish her case on a breach of
warranty basis. However, in determining that the plaintiff failed
to show that "Tide" contained any ingredient injurious to the
skin of persons using that product, the court dismissed the com-
12 Id. at p. 432. For comment on the "altogether exceptional user," see
Cumberland v. Household Research Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782(D. C., D. Mass., 1956), wherein the court, in granting the defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial, instructing that the damages awarded to the plaintiff
were excessive ($5000 for contact dermititis caused by the use of "Pine"),
and inferred that although "a person is presumed to be normal," one might
be sensitive to one substance and not to another, and that on this basis
recovery might be defeated upon a showing that the plaintiff was of an
isolated class overly susceptible to the product, whereof the defendant could
not reasonably be held to have knowledge.
13 Worly v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 114, 253 S. W. 2d 532
(1953).
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plaint, declaring that even were the plaintiff successful in prov-
ing a substance present in the product injurious to an allergic
class, the "warranty in question is limited . . . to the absence
in the preparation . . . of ingredients injurious to the skin of
normal persons using the soap in a normal manner and the bur-
den was upon the plaintiff to bring herself within the class con-
templated." 14
Summary
The ever increasing number of detergent products on the
market has caused an ever higher degree of competition among
the manufacturers. As a consequence of this, manufacturers
have been inclined to promote their products as (1) making
washdays the happiest day of the week, (2) being the stuff to
clean your house inside and out, or (3) giving you "added"
pleasure in washing dishes . . . etcetera, all for the longer
and more beautiful life of your hands!
Fortunately, however, the courts are prone to adjudicate
facts and not promotional proclamations, and have concluded in
the majority of jurisdictions that knowledge or reason to know
(by the manufacturer) of ingredients in its product injurious to
a known class of users will render the manufacturer liable for
injuries sustained therefrom, unless adequate warning is pro-
vided.
As mentioned previously, one may notice the general lack
of warning on most detergent products, which may lead us to
think that the manufacturers have come to believe in their own
slogans, or, perhaps more reasonably, that they are reluctant to
chance losing a considerable amount of the market by warning
susceptible users * * * since what woman is not concerned over
her "highly sensitive hands"! In line with this, mention might
be made concerning this author's knowledge of one international
insurance company which offers $35.00 to anyone who makes a
complaint about a certain world famous detergent manufacturer.
14 Id at p. 538. In Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.
App. 2d 157, 268 P. 2d 199 (1954), the court seemed to infer in dictum that
allergic users might recover on the basis of breach of warranty if the manu-
facturer knew or should have known that a product sold by him was
dangerous to "some" persons, even though few in number as compared with
the number of users of the product, where he failed to warn the ignorant
of the hidden danger.
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